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VI. Report on Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED that the American Bar Association:
I. Urges the Senate to take early action with a view to the ratification of
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949,
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts, with reservations and understandings along the lines proposed
by the Reagan Administration.
2. Recommends that the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services
Committees conduct careful studies and hold public hearings so that
the Senate may be able to express its views on Protocol I Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.
REPORT
A. BACKGROUND
The law of armed conflict, as codified by conventions, has two branches.
First, "The Law of Geneva," which consists of the rules for the protection
of victims. These are the Geneva Conventions which protect the wounded,
sick and shipwrecked, prisoners of war and civilians in the power of an
enemy. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has nur-
tured these conventions since 1864 when the first wounded and sick con-
vention was adopted. The present four conventions were adopted in 1949.
They now have 165 parties and are therefore universal international law.
Article 3 of each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions contains a short
bill of rights for non-international armed conflicts protecting the funda-
mental human rights of persons not taking, or no longer taking, an active
part in hostilities (Annex A). This is the only substantive article applicable
to non-international armed conflicts in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Thus the several articles of the Geneva Conventions intended to provide
for implementation and enforcement of their norms, including sanctions
under the concept of individual penal responsibility, are not applicable to
Common Article 3.
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The second branch, "The Law of the Hague," covers the rules regu-
lating the conduct of hostilities. They were last codified in the Hague
Conventions of 1907. The subsequent development of air power, and
increasingly destructive long range weapons has long since demonstrated
the obsolescence of these rules.
When, in 1949, the United Nations International Law Commission de-
clined to undertake a project to codify the law dealing with the conduct
of hostilities, the International Red Cross assumed the work of preparing
Draft Rules of the Protection of the Civilian Population Against the Dan-
gers of Hostilities. By 1968, the U.N. General Assembly considered that
there was "a need for additional humanitarian conventions or other ap-
propriate instruments to ensure better protection of civilians, prisoners
of war and combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and
limitations of the use of certain methods and means of warfare .. " The
necessary studies were to be conducted in consultation with the ICRC.
Thus stimulated and encouraged, the ICRC's preparatory work resulted
in the submission of two draft protocols (Protocol I concerning Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts and Protocol II applicable in Non-International
Armed Conflicts), which formed the negotiating texts for a Diplomatic
Conference convened by the Swiss Government in 1974. After four annual
sessions attended by 135 states (and eleven liberation movements as ob-
servers, entitled to speak, but not to vote), the Conference adopted the
two protocols on June 8, 1977.
The Protocols entered into force on December 7, 1978. As of June 1987,
66 states will be Parties to Protocol I (international armed conflicts) and
60 to Protocol II (non-international). The People's Republic of China is
the only permanent member of the Security Council to be a party to both
Protocols. France and the Philippines are parties to Protocol II only and
are the only states to be parties to Protocol II without also being parties
to Protocol I. Angola, Cuba, Cyprus, Mexico, Mozambique, Syria, Viet-
nam and Zaire are parties to Protocol I, but not to Protocol II. (250 Int'l
Review of the Red Cross 72)73, Jan.-Feb. 1986; 123 ICRC Bulletin 4 (Apr.
1986); 125 Bulletin 4 (Jun. 1986); 126 Bulletin 3 (Jul. 1986).
On January 29, 1987, the President transmitted Protocol I (non-
international armed conflicts) to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification and stated that he would not take such action with respect to
Protocol I (international armed conflicts) because it suffers from funda-
mental shortcomings which the Administration believes cannot be reme-
died through reservations or understandings.
The Administration has noted, however, that certain provisions of Pro-
tocol I reflect customary international law, and others appear to be positive
developments. Accordingly, the Administration intends to consult with
our allies to develop appropriate methods for incorporating these provi-
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sions into rules that govern our military operations, with the intention
that they shall in time win recognition as customary international law
separate from their presence in Protocol I. The Secretary of State stated
that he will make progress reports on this effort in order to keep the
Senate informed.
B. PROTOCOL II
The text of Protocol II, an article-by-article analysis and a: summary
of its provisions, as well as the President's letter of transmittal and the
Secretary of State's letter of submittal, appear in Senate Treaty Document
100)2. January 29, 1987 (Annex B, pp. iii, vii, viii, 1-15.)
1. General Background
In considering this Protocol applicable in non-international armed con-
flicts, it should be remembered that many Third World countries viewed
the effort to prescribe norms for the manner in which governments combat
rebellions as gross infringements on their sovereignty. Having succeeded
in the 1974 session, to apply international armed conflict rules to the
severely limited armed struggles for self-determination for which they
sympathized, many Third World countries sought to limit or eliminate
Protocol I1 which was intended to elaborate the basic humanitarian norms
applicable to internal armed conflicts. In the 1976 session, the coalition
of Third World States was successful in providing a high threshold for the
application of Protocol II (Article I). Under that article, the rebels must
control sufficient national territory to conduct sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement the protocol. The latter provision
is self-escalating. The more sophistication put into the substantive pro-
visions, the easier it is for governments affected by insurgencies to deny
its application.
Despite this safety valve, which would have limited the application of
Protocol II to high-intensity classical civil wars, it was doubtful that the
elaborate Protocol II being drafted in the Committees of the Conference
would be adopted at all. In the last weeks of the Conference, Pakistan
and Iraq offered a simplified version which reduced Protocol II from 47
articles to 27, and made no reference at all to "parties" (for fear that
such a reference would somehow provide recognition to rebels). In the
short time available for redrafting the Protocol, the tendency was to elim-
inate every provision that mentioned "parties to the conflict" rather than
to attempt an equivalent provision without the taboo term. The threshold
article remained untouched, formally limiting the basic and simplified
Protocol II to classical civil wars. States which did not see themselves
as potentially affected by insurgencies accepted the simplified version
because "half an egg is better than an empty shell."
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2. Distinction Between Norms Applicable in
International and Internal Armed Conflicts
A comparison between the normative restraints of humanitarian law in
international armed conflict and those applicable in internal armed conflict
reveals certain similarities. For example, the rules mandating humane
treatment and guarantees of fundamental human rights for persons de-
prived of their liberty due to the armed conflict are roughly consistent
and parallel in thrust. Much detail is omitted, however, in the text of the
rules applicable to internal conflicts. The same is the protection of the
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, of medical personnel, units, and trans-
ports, and of the civilian population against direct attacks and the effects
of attacks.
Nevertheless, significant differences exist. First, the rules applicable
in internal armed conflict omit any reference to the combatants' privilege
and entitlement to prisoner-of-war status. Also, whereas the 1949 Con-
ventions and Protocol I are replete with provisions for the enforcement
and implementation of their norms, Common Article 3 provides only that
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may offer to provide
its humanitarian services. Protocol II provides only that its text shall be
disseminated as widely as possible.
3. Relation of Protocol II to Human Rights Law
Human rights law is basic, and no matter which of the regimes of
humanitarian law may be applied to a non-international armed conflict,
human rights law continues to be applicable. Thus, human rights law and
humanitarian law operate concurrently, complementing and reinforcing
each other.
The International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and each of
the regional human rights conventions, however, permit substantial der-
ogations from human rights laws in times of public emergency threatening
the life of the nation. Nevertheless, derogation is permitted only if the
following conditions are met:
a. the emergency must be officially proclaimed;
b. the derogation must be strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation;
c. the emergency measures must not involve discrimination based on
race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin; and
d. the measures must not be inconsistent with other obligations under
international law.
Among the normative rules subject to such derogation are the fair trial
guarantees of Article 14 of the Convenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Article 6 of the European Convention, and Article 8 of the American
Convention.
SPRING 1988
270 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
On the other hand, the norms of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and those of 1977 Protocol II are not subject to derogation.
Indeed, they were formulated to be applied in armed conflict--obviously
a situation of grave public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.
With respect to procedural due process, Article 3 prohibits "the passing
of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."
Therefore, for the 165 nations bound by Common Article 3, their right to
derogate from some of the judicial guarantees of the human rights treaties
is inconsistent with their non-derogable obligation under Article 3.
4. Proposed Reservations and Understandings
The following discussion pertains to the four declarations and reser-
vations recommended by the Executive Branch (Annex B, p. 7).
a. Article 10-General Protection of Medical Duties
This article provides that under no circumstances shall any person be
punished for having carried out medical activities compatible with medical
ethics (para. 1). Persons engaged in medical activities shall not be com-
pelled to violate through acts of omission or commission, the rules of
medical ethics or professional rules designed for the benefit of the wounded
or sick, or of Protocol II (para. 2).
The proposed reservation states:
The United States reserves as to article 10 to the extent that it would affect
the internal administration of the United States armed forces, including the
administration of military justice.
Comment
Article 10 is intended to protect all "persons engaged in medical activ-
ities" from improper coercion or compulsion to violate relevant rules of
medical ethics or other professional rules designed for the benefit of the
wounded and sick or the rules of the Protocol. The scope of this protection
is not limited to the medical personnel under the control of the armed
forces or civilian medical organizations. It also covers private practitio-
ners, their nurses and medical attendants, and the medical personnel of
relief societies performing their humanitarian services in accordance with
Article 18 of Protocol II.
The proposed reservation does not affect the application of the article
to persons performing medical activities other than the "medical person-
nel" of the armed forces. Neither, does it purport to modify the prohibition
of compulsion to violate the norms of Protocol I1 as to military medical
personnel (see explanation, Annex B, p. 5).
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Other provisions of Protocol II require that all the wounded and sick
shall receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible
delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition without
any distinction or priority except those based on medical grounds (Articles
7 and 9). Moreover Article 9 provides that medical personnel shall not
be compelled to carry out tasks incompatible with their humanitarian
mission.
In view of these provisions, the proposed reservation is reasonable.
There is no internationally agreed legal definition of the term "medical
ethics." Efforts by the Diplomatic Conference to limit these standards to
those "intended for the benefit of the wounded and sick" (rather than the
economic or other benefits of the medical profession) removed some, but
not all of the ambiguities.
b. Article 16 -Protection of Cultural Objects and of Places of Worship
This article provides that "without prejudice to provisions of the Hague
Convention for the protection of Cultural Property . . . of 14 May 1957,
it is prohibited to commit any act of hostility directed against hist6ric
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cul-
tural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the
military effort."
The proposed understanding provides that the special protection pro-
vided by this article is only required for a limited class of objects that,
because of their recognized importance, constitute a part of the cultural
and spiritual heritage of peoples, and that such objects will lose their
protection if they are used to support the military effort.
Comment
Virtually every provision for the general protection of persons or ob-
jects contained in the Geneva Conventions or the additional Protocols
except this one and its counterpart in Protocol I is coupled with a provision
for the loss of protection if the protected status is abused.
Article 19 of the 1954 Hague Cultural Convention referred to in article
16, provides explicitly for a waiver of the obligation to respect cultural
property in cases of imperative military necessity. Inasmuch as the U.S.
is not a party to the 1954 Convention, it is considered prudent for the
U.S. to express this understanding. The understanding is substantially
similar to declarations made by the U.S. delegation at the Diplomatic
Conference.
c. Article I-Material Field of Application
I. The Administration considers the narrow scope and high threshold
to which application of Protocol II is formally limited by article 1(1) to
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be a deficiency because it would exclude armed conflicts in which dissident
armed groups occupy no significant territory but conduct sporadic guer-
rilla operations over a wide area.
Proposed declaration 4 is a declaration that, despite the high threshold
of the formal applicability of Protocol II, the United States will apply
Protocol II to all conflicts to which Common Article 3 applies and that it
will encourage other states to do likewise. This understanding would have
the effect of treating as non-international the so-called "wars of national
liberation" described in Article 1(4) of Protocol 1. It would continue to
exclude situations of internal tension and disorders such as riots and
sporadic acts of violence.
This is a positive step which may encourage states to at least apply the
basic norms of Common Article 3 to persons not taking an active part in
hostilities. Heretofore, many states have refused to apply Common Article
3, contending that the bloodshed occurring in their territory did not amount
to an "armed conflict." The tenor of the proposed declaration will support
efforts to arrive at common understanding as to the circumstances which
separate internal armed conflicts from disorders falling short of armed
conflicts.
2. Declarations 3 and 4 address the problem raised by a situation in
which the United States, as a party to Protocol II, assists a government
which is not a party thereto. The proposed understanding would assert
that the obligation of the State rendering assistance would not exceed
those of the State being assisted (presumably Common Article 3), but
that the United States would comply with Protocol II with respect to all
operations conducted by its own forces.
In connection with foreign intervention in noninternational armed con-
flicts a variety of circumstances should be borne in mind.
a. Assistance to the insurgents by a High Contracting Party ... insofar as this
would involve armed confrontations between two (or more) High Contracting
Parties, international armed conflict rules would apply, at least in the relation
between the intervening foreign power and the government fighting the
insurgency.
b. Situations in which rebel side controls a substantial part of the national
territory and conducts sustained and concerted military operations and has
the capacity not only to implement Protocol 11, but the rules of international
armed conflict as well. Most importantly it holds as captives military per-
sonnel of the government side and of the party assisting the government.
Under these circumstances, the option of applying international armed con-
flict rules would float to the top of the agenda. As indicated above, the fun-
damental difference between the norms of international and non-international
armed conflict rules is the absence of the combatant's privilege and entitlement
to be a prisoner of war. The essence of the combatants' privilege is an immunity
from the criminal jurisdiction of the Detaining Power for acts of violence which
do not violate the law of armed conflict.
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There is no such privilege in the conventions or Protocol 11 with respect to
non-international armed conflicts because governments are reluctant to obligate
themselves in advance to grant their domestic enemies a license to kill, maim
or kidnap the government's security personnel or to destroy objects which meet
the qualifications of military objectives, subject only to honorable detention as
prisoners of war until the termination of hostilities. But when insurgency blos-
soms into civil war, governments sometimes elect to apply international armed
conflict rules. It becomes impracticable to prosecute all captives for treason
and their acts of violence in combat. Application of the laws and customs of
war facilitates eventual restoration of peace and helps to heal the wounds of
the nation. (Recent examples-the Vietnam conflict, the Nigerian Civil War,
the Civil War in Chad). A powerful motivation is a prudent expectation of
reciprocity or a fear of retaliation in kind especially if the rebels hold a sub-
stantial number of government and U.S. prisoners.
In this connection the sequence of events leading to the decision of the U.S.
to classify Vietcong guerrillas captured in combat as prisoners of war is relevant.
The government of South Vietnam tried and publicly executed some Vietcong
terrorists. This was followed by retributory executions of Americans by the
Vietcong. Shortly thereafter the U.S. took the position that the Vietcong were
agents of North Vietnam, that the conflict was international in character and
that the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict. Reluctantly the government
of South Vietnam acceded to the U.S. view and agreed to treat captured Viet-
cong, except spies, saboteurs and terrorists, as prisoners of war. If there was
any expectation of reciprocity it was only partly fulfilled. Neither the VC nor
the North Vietnamese treated U.S. captives as prisoners of war, but they did
stop executions (Prugh, Law at War 62)63 (1975).
In approving this declaration, and it should be approved, it should be rec-
ognized that if in some future situation the insurgents against whom U.S. troops
are committed treats captives as common criminals, the pressure of the Amer-
ican public to secure prisoner-of-war treatment for them may compel action
similar to that taken in Vietnam.
d. Terms used in Part Ill, Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
In signing Protocol II in 1977, the United States expressed an
understanding:
"... that the terms used in Part III of this Protocol which are the same as the
terms defined in Article 8 of Protocol I shall so far as relevant be construed in
the same sense as those definitions."
As a matter of drafting convenience, the committee which negotiated
this Part included much of the substance in a series of definitions in order
to avoid repeating common provisions and drafting unduly complicated
sentences. In the process of simplification, the draft article on definitions
was eliminated because of the frequent use of the term "parties to the
conflict" which had become taboo in the process. As the definitions were
integral to the substance of the articles adopted by the committee, their
deletion removes the frame of reference for the terms used in Part III and
creates significant ambiguities. For example, the definition of "wounded
and sick" included such persons as expectant mothers, nursing mothers
and newborn babies who might not be sick, but who nevertheless may
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be in need of immediate medical assistance. The term "shipwrecked"
was defined to include persons in peril in internal waters as well as at
sea. The definitions of "medical personnel," "medical units" and "med-
ical transports" provided the necessary limitations as to the persons and
objects protected, and indicated the conditions under which temporary
medical personnel, units and transports would be protected.
Unless the declaration made at the time of signature carries over to the
ratified Protocol, the declaration should be reaffirmed in the instrument
of ratification.
C. PROTOCOL I
The 1977 Protocol I reaffirms and develops the so-called "Law of Ge-
neva" for the protection of war victims of international armed conflicts
in the light of deficiencies noted in the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the
armed conflicts which have taken place since 1949. It also undertakes to
update the law of the Hague rules governing the conduct of hostilities,
which have not been comprehensively codified since the 1907 Hague Con-
ventions were adopted. The dramatic development of air power and highly
destructive long range weaponry resulting in huge increases in civilian
casualties, compelled the production of additional humanitarian instru-
ments to ensure better protection for civilians and limitations on methods
and means of warfare.
The Administration recognizes that much of Protocol I reflects custom-
ary international law and that other provisions are positive developments
which it believes should become customary international law. According
to an address by Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department
of State, made on January 22, 1987, at a Workshop on Humanitarian Law
at the Washington College of Law, the Administration finds substantive
merit in the general principles of many provisions which should be ob-
served whether or not they are presently part of customary international
law. Annex C is an extract of his address identifying those principles.
The Administration's reasons for rejecting Protocol I are stated in the
President's letter of transmittal and in the Secretary of State's letter of
transmittal (Annex B, pp. iii-v, ix-x). The text of Protocol I is reproduced
at Annex D.
The most highly publicized of the Administration's objections to Pro-
tocol I are based on two provisions regarding:
1. The application of international armed conflict rules to "armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien oc-
cupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self
determination ... ?'(Article 1(4)).This provision is stated to: (a) inject
subjective and politically controversial standards into the issue of the
applicability of humanitarian law; (b) to elevate the legal status of self-
VOL. 22, NO. I
SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 275
described "national liberation" groups that make a practice of terrorism;
(c) to undermine the principle that the rights and duties of international
law attach principally to entities that have those elements of sovereignty
that allow them to be held accountable for their actions and the resources
to fulfill their obligations; and (d) would eliminate the distinction between
international and non-international armed conflicts.
2. A revision of the standards under which members of irregular armed groups
of a party to an international armed conflict (guerrillas) may qualify as
combatants and be entitled to be prisoners of war. The relaxation of these
standards is described as greatly endangering the safety of civilians while
they legitimize the acts of terrorists in disguising themselves as civilians
with concealed weapons (Articles 43 and 44).
There is, of course, another view as to the practical effect of these provisions.
An answer to these arguments appears in Solf, A Response to Douglas J.
Feith 's Law in the Service of Terror. The Strange Case of the Additional Pro-
tocol. 20 AKRON L. REV. 261-289 (1986), attached as Annex E.
In making the general allegation that these provisions promote terror-
ism, little weight is given to the provisions for individual penal respon-
sibility for grave breaches under the principle of universality which is
provided in the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.
Penal Sanctions for Acts of Terrorism
At the outset, it must be understood that Protocol I is not relevant to
acts of terrorism committed in situations short of international armed
conflicts. It does not apply to internal rebellions and insurgencies, and
certainly not to situations of internal tensions and disorders.
In the context of an international armed conflict or a belligerent oc-
cupation, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as supplemented by Protocol I,
prohibit all acts usually associated with terrorism under all circumstances,
whether committed by regular or irregular combatants. Breaches of the
norms prohibiting such acts are punishable by penal sanctions; those
classified as "grave breaches" (including murders, torture, summary ex-
ecutions, inhumane treatment, taking hostages, making civilians the object
of attack and to spread terror among them, and indiscriminate attacks
involving disproportionate civilian casualties, are made universal crimes
under the jurisdiction of all Parties to the relevant Convention or Protocol
(Annex F). The Party having control over an alleged offender is obliged
to either prosecute him or extradite him to a requesting State that has
made out a prima facie case.
However one defines "terrorism" in other contexts, within the context
of the Geneva Conventions, any violent act prohibited by the Conventions
or Protocol I committed against persons or against property which affects
the life or health of persons is an act of terrorism.
In the unlikely event that any liberation movement should qualify as a
Party to an international armed conflict, the movement would be under
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the same obligations to repress grave breaches and to suppress ordinary
breaches. Its guerrillas would be subject to the same sanctions on a uni-
versal basis. These sanctions apply not only to the individuals who commit
terrorist acts, but also to their superiors who order their commission or
who knowingly fail to prevent or suppress such breaches of the law (Pro-
tocol I, Articles 86 and 87).
The comprehensive extent to which Protocol I prohibits virtually all
violent acts committed by terrorists, and which makes the more serious
breaches universal crimes subject to the jurisdiction of all Parties, can
hadly be said to be a "proterrorist" treaty.
Wars of National Liberation
It is acknowledged that the pejorative language of Article 1(4) making
the international armed conflict rules of the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I applicable to "conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in
the exercise of their rights of self-determination" are offensive, unwise
and self-defeating. In effect they make the provision a dead letter having
no practical effect. The intended target states of this provision, South
Africa and Israel, will not accede to Protocol I and therefore will not be
bound by its provision. The pejorative code words are words of limitation
which enable all other states affected by dissident or separatist movements
to deny that these terms are applicable to them, a position which finds
plausible support in the U.S. Declaration on the Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States ex-
plicitly incorporated in Article 1(4). (See Annex E, p. 281-285, and foot-
note 77.)
The principal fear of Western States in the first session of the Diplomatic
Conference (1974) was that this provision might generate a version of the
"just war" doctrine whereby the "just" side was relieved of the restraints
imposed by the law of war on the parties to the conflict. After the politi-
cized first session, Article 1(4) was attenuated by a preambular provision
that nothing in the Protocol can be construed to legitimize or authorize
any aggression or other use of force inconsistent with U.N. Charter; and
that the Conventions and Protocol I must be fully applied to all persons
protected by them without any adverse distinction based on the nature
or origin of the armed conflict or on the cause espoused by or attributed
to the Parties to the conflict. It was further attenuated by Article 96(3)
which provides that, in order to make the Conventions and Protocol I
applicable in a qualified struggle for self-determination against a Party to
Protocol I, the liberation movement must assume the same rights and
obligations which have been assumed by the movement's adversary. If,
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as the Administration asserts, liberation movements generally practice
terrorism, few if any would wish to assume these obligations.
In view of all of the circumstances, Article 1(4) has only rhetorical and
symbolic significance, the risk of which the present administration did
not hesitate to assume when, in 1984, it ratified the 1979 hostage Con-
vention which uses the same objectionable provision.
Article 12 of that treaty coordinates its own application with that of the
norms of the Geneva Conventions and its additional Protocols by pro-
viding a means for international enforcement of the norms of the Geneva
Convention prohibiting hostage-taking even when the Geneva Convention
system provides no such international enforcement means.
Under the Geneva Convention and the 1977 Protocols, there are pro-
hibitions against hostage-taking in non-international armed conflicts and
in international armed conflicts with respect to civilians who are "pro-
tected persons" and civilians who are not protected persons. Only the
hostage taking of "protected" civilians in an international armed conflict,
however, is a "grave breach" and thus a universal crime subject to the
mandatory obligation to submit to prosecution or to extradite.
By virtue of Article 12 of the Hostage Convention, the strong obligation
to prosecute or extradite is somewhat elliptically made applicable to any
hostage-taking prohibited under the Geneva Conventions or its Protocols
whenever the obligations to prosecute or to extradite under these treaties
are not applicable. Where the obligation to prosecute or extradite exists
under the Geneva convention system, the Hostage Convention is not
applicable. Thus, the two regimes complement each other and cover al-
most every hostage-taking situation.
While deploring the rhetorical and symbolic effect of the wars of lib-
eration clause, Judge Sofaer, the present Legal Adviser of the Department,
refers to the Hostage Convention as establishing "a useful scheme for
combating hostage-taking by terrorists ... " (Sofaer, Terrorism and the
Law, 64 Foreign Affairs 901, 915-917.)
This raises the question as to why the Administration was eager to
ratify the Hostage Convention which facilitates the prosecution of ter-
rorists who take hostages despite that convention's use of the offensive
wars of liberation clause, while it considers the identical language in
Protocol I, which would facilitate the prosecution or extradition of ter-
rorists who commit almost all other crimes of violence, as a principal
reason for rejecting the Protocol.
Qualification for Privileged Combatant Status
and Entitlement to be a Prisoner-of-War
Because they are likely to be implemented with respect to resistance
movements in occupied territory during future interstate armed conflicts,
SPRING 1988
278 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
the new rules relevant to the conditions under which guerrillas may qualify
for the combatants' privilege are of much greater practical significance
than the wars of national liberation clause.
The qualification to be privileged combatants of members of militias,
volunteer groups and organized resistance movements which were not
parts of the national armed forces, were regulated in Article 1 of the 1907
Hague regulations, and their qualification to be prisoners of war after they
fall into the power of the enemy was prescribed in Article 4A(2) of the
Third 1949 Convention. The four conditions for this qualification are:
* to be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
* to have a fixed distinctive emblem visible at a distance;
* to carry arms openly; and
* to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.
As an accommodation to states which relied on an aroused and patriotic
citizenry for defense against invasion, the privilege was also extended to
The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the ap-
proach of the enemy take up arms to resist the invading troops without having
had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article I .... if they carry
their arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war. (1907 Hague
Regulations, Article 2; Third Geneva Convention Article 4A(6).
Article 2 ceases to be operative when the invader had established stable
control of the territory, but members of resistance movements which
complied with the four conditions remained privileged combatants even
when operating in occupied territory.
Although efforts had been made by the big military powers to make
participation in hostilities without complying with the four conditions a
violation of the law of war, the smaller states forced the abandonment of
those efforts at the 1874 Brussels Conference, at the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conferences. The result was that those irregulars who failed to meet those
conditions did not qualify for the combatants' privilege and were thus
responsible under the enemy's domestic law for their unprivileged belliger-
ence and criminally liable for their acts of violence which would have
been legitimate acts of war if done by a privileged combatant.
The purpose of the rigid requirement for the fixed sign and the obligation
to carry arms openly at all times was to:
(a) Preclude irregular combatants from using a civilian disguise to achieve
surprise against their adversary, and
(b) To promote the security of civilians against the effects of hostilities.
Thus, in theory, the rules promote the principle of distinction between
combatants and civilians which is an essential corollary of the rule that
the civilian population and individual civilians may not be the object of
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attack. But it soon became apparent that resistance movements and "free-
dom fighters" in territories effectively controlled by their adversaries
could not comply with that standard. As Mr. Feith points out: "Unless
[such a force] has a secure base in a region beyond the writ of the gov-
ernment it is fighting, wearing uniforms and carrying arms openly would
be suicidal." Since the standards could not be complied with in such
circumstances, they were not complied with; but since the resistance
fighters remained a legitimate target for attack, whether or not they dis-
tinguish themselves, the standard did not really protect the civilian pop-
ulation in those situations when guerrillas based themselves in a civilian
environment and derived their logistics and intelligence support from the
civilian population. It was also apparent that guerrillas who could not
qualify as privileged combatants and were subject to severe punishment
merely for their unprivileged participation in hostilities had no incentive
to comply with the laws and customs at war.
The task of the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference was to arrive at a
balance which would relax the rigid requirements of the Hague and Ge-
neva Standard sufficiently to provide guerrillas a possibility of attaining
privileged combatant status without exposing the forces fighting them to
the danger inherent in the use of civilian disguise in order to achieve
surprise. The achievement of such a balance and reconciliation of con-
flicting positions was one of the most difficult and prolonged negotiations
of the Conference.
(For a detailed discussion of the new rules see Annex E, pp. 274-280.)
Under the new rules, members of the regular armed forces and other
organized armed groups of a Party to the conflict in an International Armed
Conflict are privileged combatants if they are under a command respon-
sible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates. Like the Free French
of World War II, it does not matter whether that Party is represented by
a Government or authority recognized by the adverse Party (Article 43(1)).
All members of such armed forces are entitled to be prisoners of war,
and although they may be tried and punished for any violation of the law
of armed conflict, they do not lose their combatants' privilege or entitle-
ment to be prisoners of war unless they fail to meet the minimum standard
authorized for exceptional circumstances in the second sentence of Article
44(3) (Article 44[2]).
This rule was strongly supported by the U.S. Government in order to
prevent repetition of our unfortunate experience in the Korean and Viet-
namese conflicts when captured U.S. personnel were denied treatment
required for prisoners of war on the allegation that the armed force to
which they belong had committed war crimes or that their participation
in an aggressive war made them guilty of a crime against peace.
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Retention of prisoner-of-war status by persons charged with, and those
convicted of, war crimes is a reaffirmation of Article 85 of the 1949 Third
Convention which provides that:
"Prisoners of War prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for
acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of
the present Convention."
Article 85 was a deliberate repudiation of the contrary rule announced
by the Supreme Court of the United States in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1, 61-72 (1945), which held that the procedural safeguards prescribed in
the 1929 Prisoner of War Convention and the U.S. Articles of War relative
to the prosecution of prisoners of war were applicable only with respect
to offenses committed after capture and not to war crimes committed
prior to capture. The Yamashita decision became a precedent applied in
most post World War II war crimes programs in curtailing procedural
safeguards applicable to the trial of members of a party's own forces.
The delegates to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference were unanimous in
the view that prisoners of war tried for war crimes should have the benefit
of the Convention until their guilt was established by final conviction.
The Soviet Bloc, however, objected to the entitlement of these benefits
after final conviction and interposed reservations to that effect. North
Vietnam construed its reservation excluding persons "prosecuted and
convicted" of war crimes as running from the time of accusation.
As written, Article 44(2) of Protocol I appers to neutralize Communist
reservations to Article 85 of the Third Geneva Convention, but the Soviets
may be expected to reiterate it.
The general standard for distinction of combatants is that they are
obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they
are engaged in an attack or a military operation preparatory to an attack
(Article 44[3]). This eliminates the requirement for a fixed distinguishing
sign, and makes it clear that a part-time combatant may continue to be
a farmer by day and a guerrilla by night so long as he distinguishes himself
while engaged in a specific military operation. The price for this relaxation
is that for the first time since 1874, failure to distinguish oneself as required
becomes a breach of a norm of an international law and thus punishable
as a war crime which may also be imputed to superiors who knowingly
fail to suppress the new offense.
Just how a "military operation preparatory to an attack" is distin-
guished from other military operations remains a matter to be determined
by the practice of states. But such a combatant remains a legitimate target
for attack whether or not he is preparing for an attack, and if a group of
such combatants is based in a town or village and maintain its weapons,
logistical supplies and equipment in that place, the danger of collateral
casualties of civilians remains substantial, subject only to the prohibition
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against indiscriminate attacks and the rule of proportionality. This danger,
however, is equally present under the Hague rules. Thus, although Article
44(3) of the new rule does not do much to enhance the protection of
civilians from collateral casualties resulting from bombardment of military
objectives situated in towns and villages, Articles 51(5) and 57(2) require
substantial care in targeting only separate military objectives (rather than
the whole town) and avoiding attacks which may be expected to cause
collateral civilian casualties excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated from the attack on military objectives.
These precautions should, as a minimum, ensure that the new rules do
not enhance the dangers prevalent under the Hague rules.
The second sentence of Article 44(3), providing additional relaxation
of the traditional standard for exceptional circumstances when guerrillas
cannot comply with the general rule and retain a hope of survival, has
evoked the most intense objection. The Secretary of State commented:
Article 43(3), in a single subordinate clause, sweeps away years of law by 'rec-
ognizing' that an armed irregular 'cannot' always distinguish himself from non-
combatants; it would grant combatant status anyway. As the essence of terrorist
criminality is the obliteration of the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, it would be hard to square ratification of this Protocol with the United
States' announced policy of combating terrorism (Annex B, p. ix).
As the retention of combatant status is conditional upon the guerrilla
carrying his arms openly "during such times as he is engaged in a military
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to par-
ticipate," the Administration's anticipation of disastrous consequences
depends entirely on the interpretation of the admittedly ambiguous term
"deployment."
In explaining their votes on this provision, most delegations stated that
they understood it as meaning any movement toward a place from which
an attack was to be launched. Other delegations stated that it included
only a final movement to a firing position. Quatar and the PLO (which
had no vote to explain), stated that they understood it as covering only
moments immediately prior to attack. Apparently the Administration ac-
cepts the PLO's construction. Construing the phrase in the light of the
stated object of the rule, namely the protection of the civilian population,
the understandings, expressed by Western delegations, are undoubtedly
correct.
From a legal point of view, the declarations expressed by the United
Kingdom and the U.S. would limit their obligations under paragraph 3 of
Article 44, if expressed in an instrument of ratification, and would amount
to reservations. Such allies as Belgium, Italy and the Republic of Korea
expressed this understanding in their instrument of ratification. They would
thus limit the obligation of the reserving states to accord prisoner-of-war
status only to those hostile guerrillas who distinguish themselves by car-
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rying arms openly in their tactical movement toward the place from which
the attack is to be launched. If engaged in an armed conflict, the declaring
states would undoubtedly act in accordance with their declarations. Any
declaration of states expressing a lesser interpretation of "deployment"
could not increase the obligations of any other state and would mean only
that those states intend to treat the guerilla fighters of their enemies more
generously. As the effect of a reservation is reciprocal, they would be
free to operate under the adversaries reservation. This would soon es-
tablish the prevailing practice, and thus maintain a safeguard against legiti-
mizing the use of civilian disguise and concealed weapons as a means of
achieving surprise and the disastrous consequences to civilians envisioned
by the Administration.
In summary, the new rules of Article 44 legitimize part-time combatants,
and relax the standards for distinguishing guerrillas from peaceful civilians
sufficiently to make it possible for guerrillas to retain the combatants
privilege and thus avoid prosecution and punishment for legitimate acts
of war (but not for breaches of that law). It requires sufficient distinction,
however, to protect the adversary from the use of civilian disguise and
concealed weapons to effect surprise.
Under the old rule, failure to meet any of the rigid standards resulted
in loss of the combatants privilege and consequent liability, under the
domestic law of the captor, for unprivileged belligerence and all violent
acts whether or not such acts would have been legitimate acts of war if
done by a privileged combatant. This provided no incentive for compli-
ance with the law of armed conflict. On the other hand, the retention of
the privilege coupled with the danger of penal sanctions for violations
would seem to provide a powerful incentive for complying with the law
of armed conflict.
There are a number of ambiguities in Paragraph 3 of Article 44, which
might result in the failure to provide the indispensable prerequisite for
acceptability of the new rule: the prevention of the use of civilian disguise
and concealed weapon to achieve surprise. Most of these ambiguities,
including the meaning of the critical word "deployment," have been cor-
rected by formal understandings expressed by states at the time of sig-
nature or ratification. It might be well to formulate an understanding as
to what is meant by "a military operation preparatory to an attack" and
how that is distinguished from other "military operations" in which ir-
regular combatants are not obliged to distinguish themselves.
On balance, it would seem that the two main provisions objected to by
the Administration do not warrant rejection of the Protocol. When these
issues are viewed in their proper perspective, the remaining question is:
What other provisions for the protection of civilians are deemed to be
unacceptable by the administration and why they are so deemed?
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Military Objections
The Secretary of State's letter of submittal also states that:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have conducted a detailed review of the Protocol,
and have concluded that it is militarily unacceptable for many reasons. Among
these are that the Protocol grants guerrillas a legal status that often is superior
to that accorded to regular forces. It also unreasonably restricts attacks against
certain objects that traditionally have been considered legitimate military tar-
gets. It fails to improve substantially the compliance and verification mecha-
nisms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and eliminates an important sanction
against violations of those Conventions. Weighing all aspects of the Protocol,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff found it to be too ambiguous and complicated to use
as a practical guide for military operations, and recommended against ratifi-
cation by the United States.
The detailed review conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not been
released to the public. In its absence, it would be difficult for the Senate
to make any kind of informed judgment as to the merit of objections to
the Protocol's restraints on the conduct of hostilities. As much of the JCS
study as can be declassified should be released to the public as soon as
possible.
Some illustrative objections by the military service were disclosed by
Mr. Michael Matheson in his presentation to the workshop on Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, Annex C, and in an address by Judge Abraham
Sofaer prepared for the same workshop.
These are:
a. Articles 35(a) and 55, which prohibit methods and means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected to cause (in the conjunctive)
widespread, long term and severe damage to the natural environment
and thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population.
This provision was described as too broad and ambiguous.
Comment: The implications of these provisions should be studied
with care. In this connection it would be necessary to explore the re-
lationship of these provisions with those of the 1977 Convention on the
Prohibition of Military of Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, 31 UST 333, TIAS 9614, ratified by the U.S.
January 17, 1980. This treaty prohibits the deliberate manipulation of
natural process having (in the disjunctive) widespread, long lasting or
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any
other State Party. While the ENMOD Convention is limited to de-
liberate use of techniques to modify the environment, the Protocol
provisions prohibit objectively foreseeable collateral effect. Ac-
companying the test of the ENMOD Convention transmitted to the
U.N. General Assembly was an agreed understanding that "long-last-
ing" is measured in terms of "months, or approximately a season."
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It also included a statement that the interpretation contained in
the understanding is intended exclusively for the ENMOD Conven-
tion and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of similar
terms in other agreements.
The negotiating record of the Protocol I provision shows that most
delegations construed "long-term" in relation to decades, it being
clearly understood that any major military operations using armor
in agricultural areas, or extensive air or artillery bombardment, would
cause environmental damage lasting at least several months. More-
over, any lesser interpretation would raise serious problems as to
whether enemy tankers would have to be spared in order to avoid
the environmental effects of oil spills, or the radiation effects of an
attack on a nuclear powered warship.
b. Article 39 prohibits the use of flags or military emblems, insignia or
uniforms of adverse parties while engaging in attacks or in order to
shield, favor or impede military operations.
Comment: The "improper" use of the national flag or of the mil-
itary insignia and uniform of the enemy is prohibited by 1907 Hague
Regulation 23(f). "Improper use" was construed to pertain to the
use of enemy uniforms during combat, but their use at other times
is not forbidden. Article 39 broadens the construction of "improper
use" to include their use as a disguise in order to achieve surprise.
In this connection, it would seem that to use captured or stolen
uniforms by terrorists to achieve surprise would be almost as con-
venient as their use of civilian attire. Perhaps the modification urged
by the military forces should prohibit this disguise during a deploy-
ment preceding an attack.
(c) Article 47 provides that a mercenary shall not have the right to be
a combatant or a prisoner of war, and defines "mercenary" as a
person who meets all of the three positive and the three negative
conditions listed.
Comment: The objection is based on the inclusion, among the
positive conditions, of the motivation "to take part in the hostilities
essentially by the desire for private gain." This is described as being
contrary to the fundamental principles of humanitarian law and polit-
icizing the rules of warfare by considering "personal or political
motivation."
In analyzing the six conditions it becomes clear that only an
independent contractor who receives or is promised high compen-
sation, who participates directly in hostilities, and is not a member
of the Party's armed forces, can be a mercenary. With all the qual-
ifications in Article 47 it would seem that a party to a conflict can
rather easily avoid this designation.
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The Africans are most disappointed in the text, and it is they who
are moving in the U.N. for a more effective prohibition. It should
be noted that the use of mercenaries in Africa has occurred primarily
in non-international armed conflicts in which there is no interna-
tional obligation for the combatants' privilege or prisoner-of-war
status.
Article 47 is not incompatible with the fundamental principles of
humanitarian law. It was implicit in both customary and conven-
tional international law that the combatants' privilege and entitle-
ment to prisoner-of-war status did not extend to armed groups which
operate essentially for private ends and which do not belong to a
party to the conflict. In 1856, the principal maritime powers agreed
to abolish privateering, the practice of issuing letters of marque and
reprisal to privately owned ships authorizing them to prey upon the
commerce of an enemy state for profit. The treaty put an end to
the private plunder and other abuses arising from lack of public
control and naval discipline which characterized privateers. Article
47 establishes an analogous rule for land warfare.
A Western concern during the Diplomatic Conference was that
there was no explicit provision for humane treatment and judicial
guarantees in the text of the Article. The report of the relevant
committee made it clear that mercenaries would be one of the groups
entitled to the protection of Article 75 which establishes minimum
standards of treatment for persons not entitled to more favorable
treatment under the Conventions and Protocol I. No objection was
voiced to the report, and Ambassador Clard, the head of the Ni-
gerian delegation, who was the floor manager of the African spon-
sors of Article 47, affirmed, both in committee and plenary debates,
that the fundamental guarantees of Article 75 were applicable to
mercenaries.
d. Articles 51-56 prohibit reprisal attacks against civilians, civilian ob-
jects, cultural objects and places of worship, objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population, the natural environment
and dams, dikes and (civilian) nuclear electrical generating stations.
Comment: These are the provisions which eliminate an important
sanction against violations of the Conventions and customary law.
Although putting into effect reprisals has seldom put an end to the
violation complained of, the threat of reprisals has frequently worked
to deter or halt serious violations. The prohibitions against reprisals
would seriously undermine the credibility of any threat. Under the
circumstances, the U.S. should interpose a reservation to these pro-
hibitions. The reservation should state the customary law conditions
for resort to belligerent reprisals, including the requirement of warn-
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ing and other efforts to halt the enemy's violation, the proportion-
ality or reprisals to the enemy's violation, and the obligation to stop
the reprisal when the enemy halts his illegal action.
e. Article 56-Protection of Dams, Dikes and Civilian Nuclear Elec-
trical Generating Stations.
This Article provides special protection for dams, dikes and nu-
clear power stations, and military objectives in their vicinity against
attacks which may release dangerous forces and consequent severe
losses among the civilian population, even when these objects qualify
as military objectives as defined in Article 52(2) (para. 1).
This special protection may be lost if the object is used in regular,
significant and direct support of military operations and if attack is
the only feasible way for terminating such support. For dams and
dikes, such support must be something other than its normal function
of holding back water (i.e., use as a main supply route or platform
for heavy weapons). For nuclear power stations such support may
consist only if it provides electric power in regular, significant and
direct support of military operations.
If special protection is lost, the object would still benefit from the
rule of proportionality involving an assessment as to whether the
anticipated civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack. (In
this connection it should be noted that the grave breach generated
by this Article is limited to one committed in the knowledge that it
will result in disproportionate civilian casualties.) (Article 85[3][c]).
The objection to this Article is that it accords special protection
to objects which are legitimate military objectives, that there is no
guidance as to what are "severe" civilian losses, that it is not pos-
sible to identify the source of electrical power in a modern power
grid; that special protection would not be lost if a nuclear power
station produces plutonium; and that the Article is too complex and
ambiguous to afford guidance for military operations.
Comments: Peculiarly the Administration offers no objection to
Article 15 of Protocol II which simply provides unqualified special
protection for the same objects without provision for loss of pro-
tection. This is explained on the theory that the non-international
armed conflict is a struggle between factions for political power and
that neither side would wish to destroy its economic infra-structure.
This may not be the case in a war of succession or in a struggle
arising out of the diversion of water.
The U.S. delegation was aware of the nature of electric power
grids, and assumed that if a nuclear power station contributed to
that power which was used in the requisite support of military op-
VOL. 22, NO. I
SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 287
erations, loss of special protection would follow. Concerns about
the production of plutonium mightjustify an appropriate reservation.
In assessing the complexity problem, it should be realized that
great restraint has been applied to attacks on dams and dikes. There
have only been few attacks that threatened to breach dams and dikes,
and these were preceded by very careful planning and preparation.
These are not targets of opportunity available for discretionary attack
by single bombers, or even at squadron, group or wing level.
Accordingly the complexity of the provision should not materially
detract from the capability of the appropriate planning level to make
the necessary assessments.
In this connection, it has never been assumed that the norms of
the Convention directly provide a practical guide for military op-
erations. It is the function of Military Departments to translate these
norms into appropriate manuals for use at appropriate levels. It is
also the function of Unified Commands under the guidance of the
Joint Chiefs to issue rules of engagement tailored to the situation
where military operations take place, and which should be consistent
with the norms of international law. Complex as the rules of Protocol
I are they provide guidance to the appropriate level which is more
practical and less ambiguous than the abstract and obsolete norms
of the 1907 Hague Regulations and the equally complex but uncertain
norms of customary international law.
CONCLUSION
Ratification of Protocol II with a declaration that the United States
intends to apply it in case of any non-international armed conflict, may
provide some encouragement to states affected by such conflicts to apply
broader humanitarian protections to victims than is mandated by Common
Article 3 of the Conventions.
The urgent need to modernize the treaty law relevant to the regulation
of the conduct of hostilities in international armed conflicts, which has
not been updated since 1907, as well as the need for correcting deficiencies
in the norms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of victims
of international armed conflicts warrants the Senate to conduct careful
studies and hold public hearings as to whether the objectionable provisions
of Protocol I noted by the Administration may be cured by appropriate
reservations and understandings.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert S. Rendell
Chairman
August 1987
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